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OVERLAPPING, DUPLICATION AND CONFLICTS
AMONG MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ALVIN E. EVANS*

There is a well-known principle of municipal government that there
cannot be two municipalities possessed of the same or similar powers,
privileges and jurisdiction covering the same territory at the same
time. Perhaps the earliest expression of this principle may be found
in an early English dictum to that effect where the court explains
why such a proposition must be true, viz., "[F]or, instead of good
order, that would only be productive of anarchy."1 Whether in our
conglomerate of municipalities we have abided by this principle or
have created duplications, overlappings and conflicts due to the vast
multiplicity of municipal units is an issue which will bear study.
It will appear that the courts have not been unduly disturbed by the
inconveniences, the probability of litigation, the uneconomical operation of public business or even the anarchy which are inherent in any
scheme which departs measurably from the principle that coterminous
units should not have the same or similar powers, either wholly or in
part. Due or even excessive deference has been shown to the legislative will where the creating statutes have been drawn without adequate care. 2
The areas of conflict occur in the main: (a) where municipal units
have to some extent identical or overlapping powers given by statute,
(b) where they occupy overlapping territory, (c) where the question
of priority arises between annexation and incorporation, (d) where
one unit seeks to exercise police power over the property or activity
of another, (e) where one unit levies special assessments on the
property of another for improvements and (f) where a successor incorporation has been effected prior to a proper termination of an
earlier one.3
* Late Dean and Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
1. The King v. Pasmore, 3 T.R. 199, 243, 100 Eng. Rep. 531, 554 (K.B. 1789).
See 1 McQumrN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIoNs § 3.02 (3d ed. 1949); 1 DILLoN,
MUNICIpAL CORPORATIONS § 354 (5th ed. 1911); 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §§ 85, 86 (1949).
2. See Phillips, Legal Position of Local Units of Government in Pennsylvania, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 466, 468 (1939). "[TJhe apparent severity of constitutional
restrictions against special legislation was softened considerably by an almost
universal willingness of state supreme courts to permit legislative classification
of local units for regulatory purposes." But in Elliott v. Wille, 112 Neb. 78, 198
N.W. 861, rev'd on rehearing, 200 N.W. 347 (1924), it was held that a special
function unit must have a basis in public convenience and welfare to be determined by some competent authority outside the fiat of the organizers.
3. An interesting result may occur upon the consolidation of two units
(which subject is not discussed herein). After the consolidation of the city
and county of San Francisco, an action for damages was brought against the
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A.

UNITS HAVING SOME IDENTICAL POWERS

It is not uncommon for sanitary or other special districts to be
established within or partly within the limits of municipalities which
themselves have the power to make adequate provision for means of
protecting the public health, and in this way an overlapping arises. In
one case, a small town sought to nullify the creation of such a district
on the ground that the town itself had authority to provide for such
needs. The authority of the town had not been specifically denied by
the statute creating the district, and the town urged that two municipalities with identical powers could not coexist. In sustaining the
creation of the sanitary district, the court suggested that possibly the
town did not have equal ability to provide adequate sanitation, and
ignored the matter of probable conflict. 4 The result may be the same
where utility districts are created within the boundaries of which
exist cities having full power to develop public utilities.5
The conflict may arise even with the ad hoc units (special units
frequently for temporary purposes) themselves. Thus in one case
there were two drainage districts having a common outlet. A statute
authorized the creation of a third district to deepen the outlet, perhaps
for the very purpose of avoiding a clash between the first two.7
new unit for the death of an infant, negligently caused at a hospital of the
defendant. Under the law of California a county was not liable for such negligence but a city might be. It was held that the consolidation was to be regarded
as a city and so was liable. Beard v. City and County of San Francisco, 79 Cal.
App.2d 753, 180 P.2d 744 (1947). This case has to that extent the appearance
of a merger rather than a consolidation.
4. Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Colo. 406, 149 P.2d 662 (1944).
5. Royer v. Public Util. Dist., 186 Wash. 142, 56 P.2d 1302 (1936). See also
People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 399 Ill. 551, 78 N.E.2d 285 (1948) (a special
slum clearance project created within Chicago, though Chicago had slum
clearance power).
6. Maulding v. Skillet Fork River Outlet Union Drainage Dist., 313 Ill. 216,
145 N.E. 227 (1924).
7. In Special Municipal Corporations,18 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 319 (1929), Professor Guild reports the existence in the United States of 89 names or titles
of these ad hoc units, of which there are forty-seven varieties with as many
purposes. He defends the creation of them on various grounds, one being the
opportunity thus to evade inconvenient debt limitation statutes. According to
J. C. Phillips, supra note 2, there were in 1939 more than 175,000 municipal
units of all types in the United States. FoRDE M, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 25
(1949), cites the report of the Bureau of the Census of 1942 to the effect that
there were then 155,116 governmental units in the country. See also MUNICIPAL
YEAR Boox 15-24 (1947), showing that roughly three-fourths of these were
ad hoc units. William Anderson placed the total at 165,049 units. ANDERSON,
TE UNITS OF GOVERNMENT IN

THE UNITED STATES

(1934).

Fordham further

cites the Census Bureau report of 1942 to the effect that there were 116,878
special function units of which 108,579 were school districts. FORDHAM, op. Cit.
supra, at 27. See also Note, Overlapping Municipalities, 16 NAT. MUNIc. REV.
795 (1927).
The record shows that within St. Louis County, outside the City of St. Louis,
there are 94 incorporated cities, towns and villages. Each one of them is subject to taxation by at least three ad hoc units, such as school, sanitary, fire
and water districts. These taxes are paid in the aggregate to 61 different collectors. There is a pressing need for unified sewer and transportation systems
for St. Louis and these municipalities. Whether they can be secured without
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Sometimes the court does observe that a conflict may develop. In a
Texas case where a water control district was set up within 'the limits
of a city, the court stated that it was presumed that the city would
adjust its conflicts with the district by agreement but, absent such
agreement, the court would later resolve the conflict. 8 So in Illinois 9
where a problem of slum clearance and rehousing was involved, the
two units, the housing authority and the city, could exercise similar
powers. The court observed that these powers should be so exercised
as not to bring the two units into conflict in doing identical work for
the same area. "It is inconceivable that both corporations should entei
into a program of slum clearance by which one would be duplicating
the work of the other." One may easily suspect that advocates of
slum clearance in Chicago used this method to force the city's hand
by inducing the legislature to create the special district. It is fair to
inquire why, at least for this occasion, the city was not expressly
deprived of the slum clearance power, thus avoiding possible conflicts,
unless the city charter stood in the way. The legislature in this manner
may deal with a municipality reluctant to take measures esteemed
desirable by the legislature. In these cases the ancient principle that
two units cannot exist having identical powers in the same area was
clearly overlooked.
Yet there is strong authority the other way. Thus it has been held
that two drainage districts could not exist with similar powers in the
same area, though the second one was intended primarily to be concerned with a different stream, where the legislature had not granted
separate powers.'0
So in Oregon a water district, embracing the limits of two towns
together with some added territory, was organized to supply water for
the entire area. This authority would clearly conflict with the powers
of the towns already in existence and was held to be invalid." So also
a consolidation of all is highly questionable, due to their conflicting interests.
Compare the situation in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, where in addition to
the City of Milwaukee there exist six cities and six villages. See Maruszewski,
Legal Aspects of Annexation as it Relates to the City of Milwaukee, [1952]
WIs. L. REv. 622, 623 nn.l,2.

8. Pelly v. Harris County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 145 Tex.
443, 198 S.W.2d 450 (1946).
9. People ex tel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 399 Ill. 551, 78 N.E.2d 285 (1948).
10. People ex Tel. Bancroft v. Lease, 248 Ill. 187, 93 N.E. 783 (1910); cf. People ex tel. Shamel v. Baldridge, 267 InI. 190, 108 N.E. 49 (1915); People ex Tel.
Smerdon v. Crews, 245 Ill. 318, 92 N.E. 245 (1910) (overlapping districts forbidden). In State v. Beacham, 125 N.C. 652, 34 S.E. 447 (1899), where a Board
of Health was authorized to prepare rules and regulations pertaining to matters
of health which, when published, would become ordinances of the city, it was
held that the city commissioners were thereby deprived of power to pass ordinances covering the same matters. A similar result was had in New Orleans v.
Riisse, 164 La. 369, 113 So. 879 (1927), where the Port of Orleans, also an
ad hoc unit, was empowered to make traffic regulations within its area, which
authorization was held to exclude a similar exercise by the city council.
11. State ex inf. Flaxel v. Chandler, 180 Ore. 28, 175 P.2d 448 (1946). See
Priest v. James, 125 Ore. 72, 265 Pac. 1092 (1928) (where an area has been or-
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in the State of Washington, if a city has power over drainage and
area is not validly estabdiking, a drainage district covering the same
12
territory.
other
embraces
it
lished unless
It has been held that when its territory is later annexed by a municipality, a water district may still issue its bonds for the acquisition
of waterworks, canals, conduits, reservoirs and land for water storage
and irrigation equipment, though probably such powers may have belonged to the annexing unit such as was the Sacramento Municipal
Utility District. 13 Such a practice it would seem may conflict with the
long range plans of the municipality. In one case of annexation of a
sanitary area by a city, however, the district was dissolved and its
functions were assumed by the city, just as happens where a city
14
annexes a village.
A common phenomenon exists in many states where, though schools
and education are properly the concern of the municipal government,
yet school districts organized within the governmental unit have independent control over school matters. They frequently do not have
direct power of taxation for school support but may require the muni15
cipal council to exercise the taxing power to the extent they need.
B.

OVERLAPPING TERRITORY

1. In General
Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago16 is a most interesting early case
which seems to violate the early principle against the existence of two
units with overlapping governmental power in the same area at the
same time. The Illinois statute gave to cities and villages the power
to regulate the management and construction of packing houses within
their own limits and to the distance of one mile beyond. In the Chicago Packing Co. case the defendant packing company was located
within the boundaries of the town of Lake which had licensed it under
its ordinance. The defendant was also doing business, however, within
one mile of the city of Chicago, which city claimed the power by
ordinance to license defendant because it was within the one mile
ganized as a port authority, another port authority cannot be set up within the
confines of the first); Rathfon v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation Dist., 76 Ore.
606, 149 Pac. 1044 (1915) (two overlapping irrigation districts, each with power
to tax, cannot coexist).
12. Weatherwax v. Grays Harbor County, 116 Wash. 212, 199 Pac. 303 (1921).
See also Public Util. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 199 Wash. 146, 90 P.2d 737 (1939)
(public utility district cannot be created with power to tax for the purpose
of constructing or purchasing public utility plants within the confines of two
cities with similar powers).
13. Galt County Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal. App.2d 116, 51 P.2d 202 (1935).
14. Stone Co. v. Reilly, 158 Cal. 466, 111 Pac. 373 (1910).
15. See Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Colo. 406, 149 P.2d 662 (1944);
Kuhn ex rel. McRae v. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511, 134 N.W. 722 (1912).
16. 88 Ill. 221 (1878). This case is interpreted in 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPoRATIoNs § 354 n.2 (5th ed. 1911).
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limit. In a prosecution by the City of Chicago for failure to obtain a
license, the defense was that the defendant had received a previous
license from the town of Lake. It was held that this was not a good
defense. A small village, the court observed, should not have the
power to control matters pertaining to the health of the people of a
large city and thus be able to create a possible nuisance. "[T]he fact
that the city charter [of Lake] of 1867 empowered the municipality,
in terms, to license this character of establishments, and the general
law [later passed and conferring regulatory power over business
within the one mile limit] has omitted those express terms [power to
license packing houses], can have no bearing on the construction that
shall be given to this latter act."'17 "[T]he General Assembly, rather
than subject our large cities to such hazards from smaller municipalities in their immediate vicinity, would have repealed the charters of
the latter, or at least curtailed their power."'18 Thus the court made
over the charters of the two cities and violated the ancient principle
above referred to by a course of argument neither clear nor persuasive.
It is a common thing for statutes to permit municipalities to regulate
businesses within a stated distance of their boundaries. Suppose that
a certain business is operating within the borders of two or more units
thus extended. It could be argued (a) that the first to regulate had
priority, (b) that the closer one prevailed, (c) that as in the Chicago
Packing Co. case all had the power of control, (d) that the largest city
should prevail, and finally (e) that in view of the conflict none could
assert such power. This confusion could evidently be avoided by the
drafting of the statute with greater care.
In Alabama it has been held that the nearer or nearest town has
priority, there being three municipalities in a certain case, within the
space of 5500, 5700 and 6500 feet, respectively, of the business. 19 In another Alabama case, however, priority in time was adopted as the
applicable rule, though the court also commended the view respecting
the nearer one. Alabama also suggests by way of illustration that
throughout the country there is much imitation of the federal rule
of overlapping governments, each limited and superior within its own
sphere, but no key to the solution of this matter is given.20 In still
another Alabama case21 it was declared that both cities had jurisdiction equally under the statute, but it was further said that a judgment
against the defendant for the violation of the ordinance of one municipality could be pleaded in bar to an action on the ordinance of the
other for the same offense. It seems strange to assert that the offense
17. Id. at 224.
18. Id. at 228.

19. City of Graysville v. Johnson, 33 Ala. App. 479, 34 So.2d 708, cert. dismissed, 35 So.2d 339 (1948).

20. Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala. 634, 169 So. 288 (1936).

21. Hammonds v. City of Tuscaloosa, 21 Ala. App. 286, 107 So. 786 (1926).
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against each ordinance would be the same, even though the act is
identical, since it is commonly held that when an act becomes an offense against the laws of more than one jurisdiction, more than one
offense arises and punishment for each is not double jeopardy. 22 In an
early California case also it was held that though a city had licensed
the operation of a saloon, the county within which the city was
situated might likewise do so under the terms of the state constitution.
No notice was taken of the resulting confusion in case there should
be a conflict in the regulations.2
In a Colorado case, however, where the defendant's saloon had been
licensed by the county for the period of one year and within the year
the area where the saloon operated was incorporated, it was held that
the county license continued for its full period, but the implication is
that after the year the county lost its power to license. 24 In West Virginia in the case of New Martinsville v. Dunlap,25 the county undertook
to license the operation of a saloon which was within the limits of
town A and also within the one mile limit of another town B. It was
held that B had no authority in the matter and the defendant, who was
being prosecuted for failure to obtain a license from B, prevailed by
the consent of town A rather than by license from the county. Thus
location within a municipality prevailed over the extended limits of
another one.
2. Overlapping and Debt Limitation
There is a rather general agreement that the debts of a Board of
Education are not affected by constitutional or statutory debt limitations of the municipality within which the board operates. This is due
to its semi-independent existence even though in such cases frequently
the board does not have the power to levy a tax directly but may require the municipality to do so. In a Kentucky case this interpretation
was strengthened by the fact that the limitation was expressly applied
26
to each unit.
22. See 6 McQuILL N, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 23.10-23.13 (3d ed. 1949);
Note, 21 ILL. L. REv. 287 (1926). See also State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W.
913 (1882).
23. Ex parte Lawrence, 69 Cal. 608, 11 Pac. 217 (1886).

24. People v. Rains, 20 Colo. 489, 39 Pac. 341 (1895).
25. 33 W. Va. 457, 10 S.E. 803 (1890).

26. Board of Educ. v. National Life Ins. Co., 94 Fed. 324 (8th Cir. 1899);
Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920 (1900); Coppin v. Board of

Educ., 155 Ky. 387, 159 S.W. 937 (1913); Ex parte Newport, 141 Ky. 329, 132

S.W. 580 (1910); Kelley v. Brunswick School Dist., 134 Me. 414, 187 Atl. 703
(1936); Kuhn ex rel. McRae v. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511, 134 N.W. 722 (1912);

House v. School Dist., 120 Mont. 319, 184 P.2d 285 (1947); Sanders v. County
Ct., 115 W. Va. 187, 174 S.E. 878 (1934); Lippert v. School Dist., 187 Wis. 154,
203 N.W. 940 (1925); cf. Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580
(1912) (Port of Seattle is independent as to debt though it embraces King
County and several cities and school districts). By a Kentucky statute in cities
of the 4th class the Board of Education is not an independent corporation and
its bonds are a part of the municipal debt. Walsh v. Pineville, 152 Ky. 556,
153 S.W. 1002 (1913).
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The City of Philadelphia furnishes another illustration of debt limit
evasion, 27 in that the city evaded the debt limit statute when it was
found necessary to enlarge its sewer system and water works. The arrangement it made was to convey these facilities to a grantee, the
Philadelphia Authority, which was to perform the needed enlargement. The grantee leased these systems back to the city for a period
of thirty years at an annual rental sufficient to pay the entire cost of
the improvements. The city was to charge and collect rentals on these
structures and pay them over.
But such a subterfuge was regarded as too obvious in a similar case
in Maine. 28 One of the cities in that state desired to erect a much
needed city hall but had no funds. It thereupon created the New City
Hall Building Commission, such creations being permissible under the
statute. The city then transferred the land for the location of the
building to the commission in the form of a lease. The court regarded
the commission as a mere agency for the city, and the plan was held
to be an invalid subterfuge. In another case, likewise, where a special
taxing district was created for the construction of technical high
schools and the sole reason for its existence was to avoid the debt limit,
the plan was not sustained. 29 In cases where the city and the special
district are not independent of each other, if such there be, but the
latter has the taxing power, or is semi-independent but does not have
the taxing power, 30 or is independent and has separate taxing power,
but the debt limit of the two must be combined, the rule of first come
first served would apply and the later unit seeking credit may find the
limit already reached, even though such unit be of the higher grade. 31
City of Stamford v. Town of Stamford32 is an illusration of independent units but joint debt. The City of Stamford occupied about
80% of the township area. The case involved a petition for a declaratory judgment as to whether the limit of the indebtedness of the city
was affected by the debt of the township. It was held that under the
statute the debt of each was limited to 5% of their aggregate property
lists. The town and city, however, had not been consolidated, ap33
parently because they were not entirely coterminous.
27. Williams v. Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A.2d 834 (1938).

112 Mont. 207, 114 P.2d 1053 (1941). See Notes, 48
34

Cf. Hansen v. Havre,

MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1950),
cases arising in Michigan and Indiana.

MNN. L. REV. 360 (1950), for similar
28. Reynolds v. Waterville, 92 Me. 292, 42 Atl. 553 (1898).
29. Cerajewski v. McVey, 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650 (1947). See Notes, 25
IND. L.J. 325 (1950), 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1016 (1950), 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 263
(1937), 3 WIs. L. REv. 352 (1926).
30. See Jones v. Board of Educ., 191 Ky. 198, 229 S.W. 1032 (1921).
31. City of Stamford v. Town of Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 141 Atl. 891 (1928).
32. 107 Conn. 596, 141 AtI. 891 (1928), 38 YAi L.J. 120 (1929).
33. A letter from the mayor of Stamford, dated September 9, 1952, reads in
part as follows:
This situation (independent coexistence of township and city) at one
time was not uncommon in the State of Connecticut, as attested to by the
fact that dual governments have existed, until recently, in the following
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It is evident that the statute does not apply to the situation where
the debt obligation does not become a charge upon the property of the
municipality as in the Philadelphia case above. Thus it does not apply
where a housing project is to be maintained by a housing authority
the obligations of which are to be secured by a mortgage upon its own
34
property and are payable out of its own assets.
C.

PRIORITY BETWEEN ANNEXATION AND INCORPORATION

It seems that when an annexation proceeding of a given area has
been initiated by a municipality, such area cannot during the process
become separately incorporated. 35 Conversely, it is true that when a
certain area is in process of incorporation it cannot be annexed by a
city until after the incorporation proceeding is terminated.3 6 Thus the
proceeding first begun has priority, though this rule would not apply
communities: Danbury, New London, Norwich, City of Willimantic in
Windham, and Danielson.
To appreciate this situation fully, one must understand that the original townships, as set up by the General Assembly, included large areas
of land for a state the size of Connecticut. Over the years, it was found
that certain portions of a town developed more rapidly than the remaining section and that, because of this growth, certain municipal services
became necessary to the orderly conduct of its affairs. For example, all
of the town needed educational, welfare, road services, etc. However, the
more populated areas required a round-the-clock police and fire protection, health and sanitation.
In order to provide these latter services, residents of the populated
section obtained charters from the General Assembly, incorporating them
into separate city districts, within the town, which gave them the power
to levy taxes to defray the expenses of the added services which they
needed.
The people in the outlying districts, having no need for these additional services, of course would not be interested in being taxed for
them. The town government continued to function, as formerly, under a
Board of Selectmen, responsible directly to the Town Meeting. The city
operated within the town, with a mayor and a common council or a board
of aldermen providing the new services.
You are quite correct in observing that there was a great deal of duplicity and it was for this reason that Stamford, as well as most of the
other towns mentioned above, have now consolidated under one government. Signed, Thomas F. J. Quigley, Mayor, City of Stamford, Connecticut.
See Spencer, Cities Within Cities, 37 NAT. Muxmc. REv. 256 (1948), for an
interesting article naming several cities where this situation occurs and discussing some governmental perplexities, but not noting any litigation arising therefrom.
34. See Edwards v. Housing Authority, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741 (1939);
State ex tel. Webster Groves Sanitation Sewer Dist. v. Smith, 337 Mo. 855, 87
S.W.2d 147 (1935).
35. State ex inf. Goodman v. Smith, 331 Mo. 211, 53 S.W.2d 271 (1932);
Houston v. State, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928 (1943); Ft. Worth v. State, 186
S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); State ex rel. Binz v. San Antonio, 147 S.W.2d
551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). For a rather full development of this matter see
Maruszewski, Legal Aspects of Annexation as it relates to the City of Milwaukee, [1952] Wis. L. REv. 622, 629, 637, 639. The significance of the institution of an annexation and of an incorporation proceeding is here set out with
citations of Wisconsin cases.
36. Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274 (1874); El Paso v. State ex rel. Town
of Ascarate, 209 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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37
where the annexation or incorporation was defectively undertaken.
An area once annexed by one unit cannot thereafter be annexed by
another,3 8 which is perhaps the equivalent of declaring that one municipality cannot annex only a part of another incorporated unit.3 9
Where a unit invalidly established has issued bonds, the same area
being later validly organized is not liable on the bonds. 40 It seems also
that one unit cannot incorporate another within itself unless legislation
41
has been provided for such an event.
It has been held that where'a city annexes a special district area
such as a drainage district which has the power to float bonds, the city
cannot take over the existing powers of the district.4 The contrary
seems to be more reasonable, however, if one may assume that the
powers of the special district are within the general authority of the
43
annexing city.

D. POLICE PowER ExERcisED BY ONE UNTrr OVER THE
PROPERTY AND AcT ITY OF ANOTHER

One of the important issues which suggests conflicts between municipal units is whether the one, usually a city or town, may exercise
police powers over the property and activity of the other, commonly
a county or special district, within the borders of the former.
Must a normal school board44 obtain from the city within which it
is proposed to construct an education building a city permit as private
persons must do? May the city prescribe school buildings regulations
for the structures and require a building permit? 45 A city in Kentucky
has been held incapable even of requiring fire escapes to be installed
on a state building for the blind.46 It has been declared in Missouri
that the city could not prescribe the method of sewage disposal for
school buildings, 47 but in a later case in which there was apparently
37. Popenfus v. Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 431, 243 N.W. 315 (1932).
38. Galena Park. v. Houston, 133 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
39. State ex rel. Hilton v. Brookside, 161 Minn. 171, 201 N.W. 139 (1924);
Borough of Darby v. Borough of Sharon Hill, 112 Pa. 66, 4 Atl. 722 (1886).
40. Beyer v. City of Athens, 249 Fed. 849 (6th Cir. 1918).

41. Borough of Darby v. Borough of Sharon Hill, 112 Pa. 66, 4 AtI. 722 (1886).

42. Harris County Drainage Dist. v. Houston, 35 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Com. App.
1931); see Allied Amusement Co. v. Bryam, 201 Cal. 316, 256 Pac. 1097 (1927).
43. Stone County v. Reilly, 158 Cal. 466, 111 Pac. 373 (1910); In re Sanitary
Board, 158 Cal. 453, 111 Pac. 368 (1910).
44. Milwaukee v. McGregor, 140 Wis. 35, 121 N.W. 642 (1909).
45. Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52 Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654 (1918). The
answer here was generally "No," but it could require the placing of fire alarms
or telephones in all the buildings.
46. Kentucky Inst. for Blind v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 31 A.L.R.
450 (1906) (State did not waive its power of direct control over its property).
47. Board of Education v. St. Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 184 S.W. 975 (1916). In

Water-Supply Co. v. Albuquerque, 9 N.M. 441, 54 Pac. 969 (1898), where the
city sued a water supply company to prevent the shutting off of water from
school buildings, it was held that there could be no recovery because this was
not a city purpose.
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no change in the applicable statutes it was decided that the city had
authority to inspect the boilers of the school buildings and the smokestacks, and collect inspection fees therefor. 48 It may also require school
janitors to be firemen or engineers licensed by the city in order to
qualify for the operation of steam boilers even though the state had
authorized the school structures. 49
The Missouri cases of boiler inspection and janitor qualification seem
inconsistent with the denial of the power of a city to direct sewage
disposal, but they do accord with the decisions in several other states.
Thus in California a city may regulate the building of public schools
and may require building permits.5 0 In Massachusetts the authority
to control the storage and disposal of refuse through regulations affecting the health of the community had been entrusted in one case specifically to a special Board of Health which had not acted. Under these
circumstances the city was permitted to exercise its police power in
the matter. 51 In Kentucky, though the city cannot require fire escapes to be installed in a refuge for the blind, it has been held that
where there is a conflict between the local board of health and the
city, the latter may order persons who are afflicted with smallpox to
be removed to its pest house, even though the Board of Health does
not think this action to be advisable. The conflict here is not between
city and state but between a city and an ad hoc unit.52 In State ex rel.
Freeman v. Zimmerman,53 the school board, acting under a city ordinance, had authority to require the vaccination of school pupils. There
was, however, no conflict of authority.
Illinois has taken an emphatic position upon the matter of city
54
regulation of county buildings. Thus in Cook County v. Chicago, it
was held that the construction of a county jail within the city limits
must conform structurally to city requirements; that general rather
than local policies of government attach to the county and the powers
of the latter do not include the police power. The California case, Pasadena School District v. Pasadena,5 was cited and the precedent followed to the effect that a school board must submit plans and
specifications for its buildings to the city inspector.
48. Kansas City v. School Dist., 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930 (1947).
49. Kansas City v. Fee, 174 Mo. App. 501, 160 S.W. 537 (1913). In Smith v.
Board of Educ., 359 Mo. 264, 221 S.W.2d 303 (1949), the City of St. Louis was
held to have the power to regulate the sanitary conditions of the 42 restaurants
operated by the St. Louis Board of Education. Yet it could not compel the
same Board to take out a permit for the construction of school buildings which
would regulate the ventilation and plumbing. The court believed that the control of sanitary conditions of school buildings was by statute vested in the
school board. Board of Educ. v. St. Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 184 S.W. 975 (1916).
50. Pasadena School Dist. v. Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7, 134 Pac. 985 (1913).
51. Commonwealth v. Hubley, 172 Mass. 58, 51 N.E. 448 (1898).
52. Hengehold v. Covington, 108 Ky. 752, 57 S.W. 495 (1900).
53. 86 Minn. 358, 90 N.W. 783 (1902).
54. 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512, 31 A.L.R. 442 (1924).

55. 166 Cal. 7, 134 Pac. 985 (1913).
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It is submitted that the California-Illinois rule in this respect is the
only practical one. A city which has extensive duties respecting safety
from fire, and the health, convenience and happiness of its citizens,
may well be seriously thwarted by violations of its policies, especially
with respect to fire control, sewage disposal, height of buildings and
general policy even including matters of aesthetics. No case seems
to say clearly that ad hoc units and counties may or may not violate
zoning restrictions. Surely, however, Illinois would not permit a
county jail to be built in a zone restricted to residence or in close
proximity to schoolhouses. Apparently no such conflict has ever
arisen; at least this writer has not found any. All other inferior units
should be subject to the city's zoning laws.
The result in People ex rel. Carrollv. Lakewood 56 is analytically difficult in view of the Illinois position that the municipality wherein
county property is found has police and regulatory power over it. In
that case a certain park area had been conveyed to Grafton township
prior to the creation of the village of Lakewood. On the establishment
of the latter covering the area of the park, the village extended its police powers over the park with respect to health, sanitation, public
order, and morals and had specifically regulated the use of bathing
suits and bathing beaches. It had also cancelled the lease by the township to one Foster of a certain small wooden building used for the sale
of merchandise of the character commonly bought by park visitors.
It was held that the other police regulations were valid but that the
village had no power to prevent the concession to and sale of this merchandise by Foster under the pertinent statutes applicable to park
commissioners. The difficulty here is to find a distinction in the statutes
between the police control approved and that not approved. Conflicting
policies between commissioners and village may well arise. It is
somewhat similar to the holding in another case 57 mentioned above
that although a city could not regulate the building of school scructures or require a building permit, it still might require the installation
of fire alarms and telephones.
Here also comes the interesting case 58 where county and city were
in conflict over the policing of a certain seawall which was both a protection against storms and a heavily traveled street. The city claimed
full police power because a street was involved. It therefore assumed
control over traffic and proceeded to construct parking meters on the
street borders. Galveston County asked an injunction against the installation of parking meters on the ground that they would collect
flotsam and debris and thus endanger the effectiveness of the wall as
56. 368 Ill. 209, 13 N.E.2d 275 (1938).

57. Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52 Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654 (1918).
58. City of Galveston v. Galveston County, 159 S.W.2d 976 (Tex. Civ.
1942).
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a defensive barrier to the storm waters of the gulf. The court decided that the principal object of the construction of the seawall was
not the creation of a street as such, but it was intended primarily as a
protection against storms. Considering the history of the legislation
which authorized the structure, it was not hard to conclude that the
county police power in this one respect should prevail over that of the
city, though otherwise the regulation of traffic was an obligation of
the city.
Several cases hold that a city may abate a nuisance maintained by
the county within the city limits. Thus, a village may abate a liquor
store which the county had set up.59 Another illustration is from Tennessee where the city prosecuted successfully the agent of the county
for maintaining horse racks around the courthouse enclosure. These
horse racks were declared to be a nuisance. So also the city may
cause to be removed a jail and cesspool from the county square.60
E. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Special assessments also create conflicts between municipal units
when the one denies the authority of the other to levy them. A considerable number of states hold that a municipality cannot charge
special assessments for the improvement of the property of another
unit. The usual reasons are (a) that there is no power to tax unless
such power is specifically granted, (b) to levy a tax would simply
shift the burden from one governmental unit to another, and (c) the
land of a state agency is no more to be assessed than land held directly
by the state. The principle of governmental immunity is thus applied
even to local units.
So in Kentucky it was held that public school grounds as well as
those of the Kentucky Reform School were not chargeable with the

costs of street improvements. 61 A long list of cases may be found also
in Missouri which have consistently held that such special assessments
are invalid. 62 These cases involve school grounds, courthouse squares
and the like. A Missouri statute passed in 1931 permitted cities, towns
and villages to charge school districts proportionately for the construction and maintenance of sewers serving them but went no further. 3
59. Coulterville v. Gillen, 72 l.599 (1874).
60. City of Llano v. Llano County, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 132, 23 S.W. 1008 (1893).
There is a dictum to the same effect in City of Victoria v. Victoria County,
94 S.W. 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Tex. 438, 101
S.W. 190 (1907).

61. Louisville v. McNaughten, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1695, 44 S.W. 380 (1898);
Louisville v. Leatherman, 99 Ky. 213, 35 S.W. 625 (1896).
62. City of Edina v. School Dist., 305 Mo. 452, 267 S.W. 112, 36 A.L.R. 1532
(1924).
-63. Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Wellston Sewer Dist., 77 S.W.2d 477
(Mo. App. 1934). The earliest Missouri case, however, was contra. St. Louis
Pub. Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468 (1858).
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this position in an early case involving
Massachusetts also had taken
64
a county courthouse square.
Occasionally a distinction is made between special assessments for
the improvement of property not at the time used for a public purpose, such as an empty lot, and land used for a governmental purpose,
such as a courthouse square or school grounds. The former is oc65
casionally held assessable.
On the other hand Illinois supports the view that municipal lands
66
within the limits of a city should bear their own improvement costs.

In harmony with this view, Colorado has declared that such improvements and assessments therefor are justified on the ground of being
of purely local concern.67 It holds that the principle of exemption
from taxation of governmental property does not apply because special
assessments are neither property nor excise taxes and, in fact, do not
constitute taxation,68 and further, that this result is the only equitable
one. The same rule is found in Kansas, Louisiana, Montana and Oklahoma.69 The fact that the lien for the charges cannot be foreclosed
does not prevent the right to it from accruing.70
In Montana a special assessment for street sprinkling along school
grounds was not sustained for the reason that it was not a permanent
improvement.71 The general principle however of liability for improvements is recognized there.72 In Florida the same statute on
64. Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193 (1874). Note, ANN. CAs.
1917D 843, asserts that the same rule applies as well in Alabama, Georgia,
Nebraska, Tennessee and Texas. Cf. 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 1332
(1950); 38 Am. Jup., Municipal Corporations§ 393 (1941); 16 McQmn, MumICiPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 38.74 (3d ed. 1949).

65. In re Auditor Gen., 199 Mich. 489, 165 N.W. 771 (1917). Cf. State ex rel.
Great Falls v. Jeffries, 83 Mont. 111, 270 Pac. 638 (1928); Blythe v. Tulsa,
172 Okla. 586, 46 P.2d 310 (1935).
66. Adams County v. Quincy, 130 Ill. 566, 22 N.E. 624 (1889); Scammon v.
Chicago, 42 Ill. 192 (1866). But see West Chicago Park v. Chicago, 152 IIl. 392,
38 N.E. 697, 701 (1894).
67. Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301
(1919).
68. See also among others holding that such assessments are not taxes:
Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919);
Adams County v. Quincy, 130 III. 566, 22 N.E. 624 (1889); Kalispell v. School
MuNicn.iAL
Dist., 45 Mont. 221, 122 Pac. 742 (1912); see also 16 McQumnr.,
CoRPoRATIONs § 14.46 (3d ed. 1949); 4 DILLON, MUmcNPAL CoRPoRATIONS §§ 14301469 (5th ed. 1911); cf. Harlan County v. Thompson, 125 Neb. 65, 248 N.W. 801
(1933).
69. Board of Commissioners v. Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747, 31 Pac. 788 (1892); Monroe v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 172 La. 861, 135 So. 657 (1931); Town of
Franklinton v. Policy Jury of Washington, 126 La. 2, 52 So. 172 (1910); State
ex rel. Great Falls v. Jeffries, 83 Mont. 111, 270 Pac. 638 (1928); Ford v. Great
Falls, 46 Mont. 202, 127 Pac. 1004 (1912); Kalispell v. School District, 45 Mont.
221, 122 Pac. 742 (1912).
70. Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301
(1919); Blake v. Tampa, 115 Fla. 348, 156 So. 97 (1934); Monroe v. Ouachita
Parish School Bd., 172 La. 861, 135 So. 657 (1931); Blythe v. Tulsa, 172 Okla.
586, 46 P.2d 310 (1935).
71. Butte v. School District, 29 Mont. 336, 74 Pac. 869 (1904).
72. Ford v. Great Falls, 46 Mont. 202, 127 Pac. 1004 (1912).
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taxation which is held not to relieve municipal property, though it
does not mention special assessments specifically, does relieve federal
property from such charges. Florida has now passed a statute covering
73
the whole matter which permits special assessments in such cases.
It seems, in view of this diversity, that the tax exemption statutes
have usually not been drawn with care, and it is left to inference
whether special assessments are included. The chaotic condition of
such statutes has been the subject of comment.74 There seems to be
no sufficient reason why government property should escape this
burden any more than should the property of charitable units.75
An unusual illustration of municipal duplication involving overlapping assessments has appeared in Arkansas. The particular problem referred to has not so far been discovered by the present writer
to exist save in Arkansas. G. D. Walker states that "Few states have
been more abundantly blessed (or cursed) with special improvement
districts than Arkansas."7 6 He cites no other states on conflicting tax
titles in his article on overlapping improvement districts.
In Street Improvement District v. Pinker 77 there was a sewer district which overlapped completely, so far as appears, the area embraced within a street district. The sewer district had been created
first. Each special district had levied taxes to pay for improvements
which each had individually constructed, each had issued bonds and
sold them and had been obliged to sell the area covered for unpaid
tax assessments, and each, having bought the area in at the sale had
purportedly taken title. Thereafter the sewer district had resold its
interest to one Pinkert and the street district had resold to McMinn.
Pinkert sued to quiet title, making McMinn defendant. The Street
District then intervened and claimed the right to a second foreclosure
and sale for later tax assessments, in the face of the fact that it had
already conveyed its title to McMinn. It was held (a) that no right
of priority of title or interest arose to the sewer district because of its
earlier creation or earlier foreclosure and sale, (b) that Pinkert and
McMinn were joint tenants, their interests corresponding to the sums
73. Gainesville v. Alachua County, 69 Fla. 581, 68 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1917D
843 (1915).
74. Kalispell v. School District, 45 Mont. 221, 122 Pac.742 (1912).
75. See Mullins v. Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Ass'n, 239 Mo. 681, 168 S.W. 685
(1914); Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N.Y. 506 (1871). In 39 NAT.
Mu-mc. REV. 87 (1950), may be found a statement of policy by the American
Municipal Association (Dec. 2, 1949) with respect to relations between governments to the effect inter alia that the federal government should provide for
payments in lieu of taxes and that state governments should place no service
burdens upon municipalities.
76. 1 ARK.L. REV. 32 (1947). In the two volume work, SLOAN, THE. LAW OF
IMPROVEMENT DISMUCTS iN APmANSAS (1928), there is scarcely any reference to
the overlapping of districts on the territory of each with respect to taxing.
See id. at § 897. This may indicate that the problem of overlapping taxation
has arisen largely since 1928.
77. 253 S.W.2d 780 (Ark. 1952).
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each had paid to satisfy liens, and that (c) the right of a later foreclosure for later assessments still existed in the taxing unit, though
the earlier claims were still wholly unsettled.
Though a statute purported to declare the order in which such
claims could be settled, the statute was of doubtful application and
seems not to have had any effect upon the result. The court suggested
that three theories or starting points for the solution of the problem of
conflicting titles and liens existed. The first was that the first district
to foreclose could do so free of all other liens, and could get a clear
title, after which presumably no further levy could be made by another unit, inasmuch as municipal property is not usually subject to
special taxation. The second was that the last foreclosure and sale
afforded a similar priority to the later purchaser. These two were rejected, perhaps because of the difficulties which would arise in the sale
of securities by the municipal units through the adoption of either
rule. The third rule, that the districts or their transferees become
tenants in common, was adopted.
In another case7 8 the older unit, a levee district, had issued bonds.
The Improvement District later did the same. The latter covered
about two-thirds of the area of the former. The latter unit defaulted
on its bonds and was placed in the hands of a receiver. Thereafter
the Levee District sold the common territory for unpaid taxes and
bought it in. In the foreclosure proceedings the Improvement District,
the receiver and the trustee for the bondholders were made parties
defendant. The court took the view that the Levee District could not
sell the area free from past tax obligations of the other unit, but could
sell it free from other future tax assessments of a different unit, and
that the land was still liable for later assessments made by the levee
unit.
It appears that each unit may enforce its liens for taxes without
reference to the other.7 9 In another case, 80 however, it was held that
after a unit had foreclosed its tax lien and bought in the land, it could
not foreclose again on itself for subsequent tax claims. This, however,
is inconsistent with the later case, above, to the effect that a foreclosure does not prevent the same unit from having a later tax claim.
Confusion seems worse confounded by these Arkansas overlapping
units and special taxing assessments, statutes and decisions. Why
should two or more units be created for almost but not quite the same
purpose in the same area, such as sewer districts, improvement dis78. Board of Commissioners v. Board, 181 Ark. 898, 28 S.W.2d 721 (1930).
79. Deaner v. Gwaltney, 194 Ark. 332, 108 S.W.2d 600 (1937). In six tax
sales, four were void and two were valid. The land is always sold subject to
all liens existing at the time of sale. Oliver v. Gann, 183 Ark. 959, 39 S.W.2d.
521 (1931).
80. Crowe v. Wells River Say. Bank, 182 Ark. 672, 32 S.W 2d 617 (1930).
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tricts, drainage districts,81 and others acting concurrently when the
entire power could be given to one? This would avoid all the conflicting tax assessments, sales and liens. How can prior and subsequent
purchasers have an exact equality of interest? How can a unit having
foreclosed and taken title, foreclose again while it still has title? How
may one unit sell and convey while the title is in another unit? 82 How
can there be two owners at the same time, each claiming the entire
interest under a valid sale?
There is the further difficulty that one governmental or ad hoc unit
can levy a special tax upon the property of another. Not even the state
which buys a given area for taxes can free its land of the ad hoc unit's
83
encumbrances.
F. SUCCESSIVE BUT COEXISTING INCORPORATIONS
Can a subsequent incorporation be validly made while a prior one
occupying all or part of the same area purports to exist? It is to be
assumed that as matters subsequently turn out, the creation of the
prior unit was invalid or its continued existence has become questionable. In Enterprisev. State8 4 an incorporation of detached tracts had
been undertaken. The legislature by special act had purported to
validate the alleged incorporation. Thereafter, before any test of the
statute had been made, a new incorporation of a part of the area was
set up in a formally correct manner. Thereupon quo warranto proceedings were brought against the second incorporation. It was held
that quo warranto would not lie inasmuch as all the prior acts, legislative and otherwise, were void.
In an early English case 85 it was held that where the former unit had
been so reduced by the negligence of the authorities that it was inadequate for the purpose of government, it was automatically dissolved and a new one without further reference to it could be created.
A case arose in Alabama rather similar to the English case here cited.8 0
For many years the officers of a town did not function and there were
no elections. On the assumption that the charter had been forfeited
81. Thus in Thibault v. McHaney, 119 Ark. 188, 177 S.W. 877 (1915), a drainage district had been set up. After that a levee district was created. The
contractors to build the levees arranged with the contractors of the drainage
district to build the levees needed in the levee district.
82. Deaner v. Gwaltney, 194 Ark. 332, 108 S.W.2d 600 (1937).
83. Crowe v. Wells River Say. Bank, 182 Ark. 672, 32 S.W.2d 617 (1930);
In re Gould, 110 Minn. 324, 125 N.W. 273 (1910).
84. 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740 (1892). See also State v. Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371,
5 So. 818 (1889) (where a de facto unit existed in the same area later incorporated, it was held that though the second unit was valid its functions were
in abeyance until the ouster of the former). See 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 83 (1949).
85. The King v. Pasmore, 3 T.R. 199, 243, 100 Eng. Rep. 531 (K.B. 1789). See
2 McQumLvr, Muxcn'. CORPORATIONS § 8.03 (3d ed. 1949).
86. Butler v. Walker, 98 Ala. 358, 13 So. 261 (1893).
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by this neglect, a new municipality was created and two elections of
officers were successively held. On a petition for the ouster of the
newly elected second set of officers for usurpation, it was held (a) that
the first charter had not been forfeited by non-user, (b) that the new
incorporation was void, but (c) that the first set of officers, though
irregularly elected under this organization, were de facto officers of
the prior municipality, and (d) that the later election held under the
de facto incumbents made their successors de jure officers. This would
seem to be the modern and sound approach and is a position preferable
to that taken by the English court.
Where a unit has not been properly created but nevertheless issues
bonds, and further, while an action is pending on the bonds, a new
unit is validly established, the latter is not liable on the bonds. Ii
such a case liability would arise only by specific declaration of the
87
legislature.
CONCLUSION

The principle that there should not be two municipalities possessed
of the same or similar powers, privileges and jurisdiction (or even
some of them) within the same area at the same time seems almost too
self-evident to be arguable. This principle has been needlessly violated, sometimes to a greater and sometimes to a lesser degree by the
drafters of statutes who have not visualized the possibilities of future
conflicts. In general, the statutes should clearly assign powers and
duties to the one and deny them to the other. Where the geographical
areas of each are distinct and each has powers similar to those of the
other the powers as well as the territory Should not overlap. Thus, if
two municipalities have the power, each to regulate the conduct of a
particular business, e.g., a packing plant, one is likely to command
a thing which the other prohibits.
There has been very little constitutional or statutory tinkering with
the matter of debt limitations as affected by overlapping of taxing
units. No doubt it would be difficult to foresee what emergencies may
arise to make close regulation impracticable. One solution may be to
give wider powers to cities and reduce the number of ad hoc units. To
abolish school districts, however, within a municipality, thus throwing
an unwanted responsibility upon councilmen, would probably not be
wise. The school system needs a different type of control. We can
probably trust the courts to decide whether or not a proposed method
of escaping the statutory debt limit is a mere sham.
The incorporation of additional villages and towns goes on apace,
attributable largely, no doubt, to local pride rather than to a striving
for local benefits. It can scarcely be argued that the existence of
87. Beyer v. Athens, 249 Fed. 849 (6th Cir. 1918).
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ninety-four such units in St. Louis County, Missouri, is economically
or socially beneficial. The unification of the sewer and the transportation systems, to name two only, is thus either hindered or prevented.
However, when a larger city has the power to annex adjoining territory whose inhabitants desire their own small organization, the general principle is that the first to act may decide the issue. The statutes
on the matter moreover should be drafted with the view of providing
for the greater general public convenience. The annexation is likely
to be more generally beneficial.
Whether one municipality should have police power over the property and activity of another within its boundaries should in general be
answered in the affirmative and zoning ordinances should be obeyed
by all units which come in some way into another municipality's confines. The city should have the power to abate nuisances from whatever source and take needed measures for problems of health and
safety. Should the obligation of zoning laws apply to the state as well
as to municipal units?
Suppose a state university is established within the city borders.
It may even include a farm whereon pigs, chickens, cattle and sheep
are maintained for experimental purposes. Must the buildings be constructed under city zoning regulations? Should the university, on the
other hand, be regarded as a direct arm of the state and so free from
municipal regulation? Undoubtedly the state may free its creation
from local control if it so chooses. Probably any unit which is directly
and importantly concerned with state affairs would not be subject to
local control. School districts, however, existing within the city as
minor units may well be under city requirements until the state
chooses to interfere. If this be true then public school buildings should
conform to municipal building regulations.
It is believed that the case is already made out for special taxation
levied for improvements on the property of one unit, by a superior unit
within which its property is found. Federal legislation providing for
the payment for similar improvements should exist also.
In Arkansas, however, the taxing of a municipal area under the control of another one so that the procedure ultimately is equivalent to
each unit taxing the other, seems wholly undesirable. In general both
the overlapping of territory and o powers, especially the taxing
power, is unfortunate.
Finally, the American view seems preferable to that stated in an
early English case respecting the forfeiture of a charter by non-user.
If no court test has been made the Alabama holding that the charter
and the original powers stMi exist seems acceptable.

